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EQUITY PARTICIPATION IN TEXAS: A LENDER'S DREAM
OR A USURIOUS NIGHTMARE?
by James P. Cooke
Accordingly all the saints and all the angels of paradise cry then
against [the usurer], saying, "To hell, to hell, to hell." Also the heav-
ens with their stars cry out, saying, "To the fire, to the fire, to the fire."
The planets also clamor, "To the depths, to the depths, to the
depths."'
Such was the judgment, according to the Roman Catholic Church, against
anyone charging usurious interest. Prohibitions against usury date back to
ancient times. 2 The earliest recorded usury statutes are found in the laws
of Eshnunna,3 the Code of Hammurabi,4 and the legal,5 poetic, 6 and pro-
phetic7 literature of the Old Testament, thus making usury not only legally
but also morally reprehensible. Over the centuries absolute restrictions
against usurious interest have been modified,8 but restraints continue to be
imposed in order to protect the unwary and unsophisticated borrower.9
1. S. HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 69 (1963).
2. For a history of usury, see generally S. HOMER, supra note 1; B. NELSON, THE IDEA
OF USURY (1949); J. NOONAN, THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY (1957); J. WEBB, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF USURY AND, INCIDENTALLY, OF INTEREST (1899); Bernstein,
Background of a Gray Area in Law.- The Checkered Career of Usury, 51 A.B.A.J. 846 (1965);
Frierson, Changing Concepts on Usury: Ancient Times Through the Time of John Calvin, 7
AM. Bus. L.J. 115 (1969); Hershman, Usury and the Tight Mortgage Market, 22 Bus. LAW.
333, 334-36 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hershman, Usury]; Lowell, A Current Analysis of
Usury Laws. A National View, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 193, 194-95 (1971); Merriman &
Hanks, Revising State Usury Statutes in Light ofa Tight Money Market, 27 MD. L. REV. 1, 6-
12 (1967); Pearce & Williams, Punitive Past to Current Convenience-A Study ofthe Texas
Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 233-34 (1968); Shanks, Practical Problems in the Application
ofArchaic Usury Statutes, 53 VA. L. REV. 327, 327 (1967).
3. The interest ceiling prescribed by these laws was 1635%. The Laws of Eshnunna
§§ 18a & 21 (Goetze trans.), reprinted in ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN TEXTS RELATING TO THE
OLD TESTAMENT 162 (2d ed. Pritchard 1955).
4. The Code limited interest on loans of corn or silver. G. DRIVER & J. MILES, THE
BABYLONIAN LAWS: LEGAL COMMENTARY 173 (1956).
5. Leviticus 25:35-38. Accord, Exodus 22:25; c. Deuteronomy 23:20 ("You may charge
interest to a foreigner .....
6. Psalm 15:1-2, 5.
7. Ezekiel 18:5-18.
8. The prohibitions survived with some exceptions until the Reformation, when reli-
gious leaders, such as John Calvin, recognized that a limited interest charge was permissible
as a normal cost of doing business because of the income-producing capability of money. S.
CLOUGH & C. COLE, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE 152 (1952). Pope Nicholas III al-
lowed the Florentine banking families to charge usurious rates and helped them collect on
their loans by threatening the borrower with excommunication. Id. at 82.
9. Baske v. Russell, 67 Wash. 2d 268, 273, 407 P.2d 434, 437 (1965) (The Washington
Supreme Court expressed the view that usury statutes are "designed to protect those who by
adversity and necessity of economic life are driven to borrow money at any cost. The pro-
tection granted is based on the fact that many borrowers are powerless to resist the avarice of
the money lenders."). Texas usury statutes reflect this view by allowing parties in more
sophisticated business deals to charge higher interest rates. See note 31 infra. See also Mer-
riman & Hanks, supra note 2, at 1.
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The present advent of high interest rates in a tight money market' 0 cou-
pled with comparatively low legal maximums have produced a lending
atmosphere conducive to finding new methods of obtaining a more profita-
ble return on invested capital while avoiding usury penalties. One such
method is equity participation. Although this term encompasses many
types of transactions, I the basic concept involves an advance of money in
consideration for some form of ownership position in the borrower's enter-
prise given in lieu of or in addition to simple interest. The advantage of
equity participation to the lender' 2 is the possibility of a net return far
greater than simple interest. To the borrower' 3 the advantages are the
ability to attract lenders to a high risk venture and, in some cases, to be
relieved of paying back the lender should the venture fail.' 4
Because of the advantages to both lender and borrower, equity partici-
pation transactions have increased in recent years.' 5 Lenders, accustomed
to the secure position of a guaranteed return of principal and interest, have
attempted to structure equity participation transactions within the frame-
work of secured lending. At some point, however, this structuring can
cause equity participation to become indistinguishable from a simple loan.
Once a court deems the transaction to be a loan, an allegation of usury
becomes a distinct threat to the lender, especially because equity participa-
tion is often designed to allow for a high return. Texas courts may now be
even more suspicious of alleged usurious transactions as a result of the
holdings in recent cases 16 in which the parties resorted to unique methods
to circumvent usury prohibitions. '7
This Comment (1) identifies the various forms of equity participation
that Texas courts have scrutinized; (2) delineates the elements of a usuri-
ous transaction; and (3) applies those elements to equity participation in
10. See generally Hershman, Usury and the Tight Mortgage Market-Revisited, 24 Bus.
LAW. 1121 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hershman, Usury Revisited]; Hershman, Usury, supra
note 2; Merriman & Hanks, supra note 2.
11. See text accompanying notes 18-30 infra.
12. This Comment uses the term "lender" to refer to one who advances capital. The
term is not used to imply that the transaction is a loan.
13. This Comment uses the term "borrower" to refer to one who receives capital, or
whose enterprise receives capital from a "lender" as defined in note 12 supra. The term is
not used to imply that the transaction is a loan.
14. The transaction may also involve certain tax advantages or disadvantages. Com-
pare Podell, The Application of Usury Laws to Modern Real Estate Transactions, I REAL
EST. L.J. 136, 149-50 (1972) with Marcus, Real Estate Purchase-Leasebacks as Secured
Loans, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 664, 675-77 (1974), Cary, Current Tax Problems in Sale, or Gifo, and
Lease-Back Transactions, 9 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 959, 966-67 (1951), and Wilson, Sales
and Leasebacks, 1964 S. CAL. TAX. INST. 149, 162-63.
15. Hershman, Usury Revisited, supra note 10, at 1138. See also note 42 infra.
16. See Skeen v. Slavik, 555 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ refd n.r.e.);
Commerce Say. Ass'n v. GGE Management Co., 539 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[ist Dist.]), mod#fed, 543 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. 1976).
17. Loiseaux, Some Usury Problems in CommercialLending, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 419, 420
(1971). A similar concern for usury circumvention was voiced over 200 years ago by Lord
Mansfield: "[W]here the real truth is a loan of money, the wit of man cannot find a shift to




general, thus pointing the way toward equity participation schemes that
will survive usury challenges.
I. TYPES OF EQUITY PARTICIPATION
Defining equity participation as a transaction in which the lender ad-
vances money to the borrower in consideration for an ownership position
in the borrower's enterprise given in lieu of or in addition to a guaranteed
percentage of return broadens the traditional definition given by other
commentators' 8 who have focused on more typical lending transactions.
Numerous Texas usury cases, however, deal with transactions quite unlike
a conventional loan. A purchase of stock,' 9 for example, would fit the
broadened definition of equity participation. Such a purchase may be
found usurious if the elements of usury20 underlie the transaction. This
Comment approaches the usury implications of equity participation by us-
ing the most inclusive definition of equity participation transactions and
then analyzing the specific types of transactions within that general defini-
tion to determine if they possess the elements of usury.
Conceptually, equity participation transactions fall into two broad cate-
gories based on the relative permanence of the lender's ownership position
vis-A-vis the borrower's ownership position. The first involves both the
borrower's and the lender's owning a share of the enterprise until its termi-
nation, with the lender's share determined by a designated formula. In the
second broad category, the lender's ownership position or part thereof
transfers to the borrower upon the occurrence of a designated condition.
Variations of the first category found in Texas case law include transac-
tions in which the lender's interest in the enterprise is based on a limited
partnership agreement;2' an option to purchase;22 a designated source of
income to the enterprise;23 or a designated percentage of the enterprise's
18. Eg., Comment, The Application of Texas Usury Laws to Equity Participation Agree-
ments, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 925, 927-28 (1970) ("The basic element inherent in al equity
participation agreements is the lender's willingness to subject part of his return to a contin-
gency."). Although contingency may be an element of some equity participation transac-
tions, it is not a necessary element. A sale-leaseback, for example, is an equity participation
transaction that often involves no element of contingency. Contingency is only one step of
the usury analysis. See notes 34-37 infra and accompanying text. A transaction may have a
contingent element, yet a court may find that it does not constitute a loan and, therefore,
may never reach a consideration of the effect of the contingency on the question of usury.
19. Hershman, Usury and "'New Look" in Real Estate Financing, 4 REAL PROP., PROB.
& TRs. J. 315, 317 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hershman, "New Look'l. See, e.g., Skeen v.
Slavik, 555 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
20. See text accompanying notes 34-40 infra.
21. Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ); Pickrell v.
Alpha Pipe & Steel, Inc., 406 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Kollman v. Hunnicut, 385 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1964, no writ); Burton
v. Stayner, 182 S.W. 394 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1916, writ ref'd).
22. Cochran v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 568 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1978, no writ); Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co. v. Price, 566 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bomar v. Smith, 195 S.W. 964 ('Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1917, no writ).
23. Wagner v. Austin Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 525 S.W.2d 724 (fex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1975, no writ); Thompson v. Hague, 430 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, no
writ).
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sales, 24 income, 25 or production. 26 The usury implications of these forms
of equity participation generally involve questions of whether the transac-
tion was intended to be a loan or merely an advance of working capital
and whether the lender's return was subject to risk.
Variations discovered in Texas cases involving the second broad cate-
gory of equity participation, in which the lender's interest in the enterprise
is obtained and subsequently transferred to the borrower, include transac-
tions effected by means of a purchase from a third party and a sale to the
borrower,2 7 a purchase from and resale to the borrower,2 8 a "put and call"
agreement between lender and borrower, 29 or a lien or other form of secur-
ity by the lender against the borrower with a subsequent release. 30 The
usury implications of these forms of equity participation generally involve
questions of whether the transaction was intended to cloak a loan in the
disguise of a sale or an option and whether the sale or option contained
sufficient elements of coercion such that the occurrence of either was a
virtual certainty.
II. ELEMENTS OF USURY
The Texas Constitution establishes the basis for Texas usury laws. 31 Al-
24. Beavers v. Taylor, 434 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968, writ ref d n.r.e.).
25. Ellis v. Security Underground Storage, Inc., 329 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1959, no writ); Ragland v. Short, 245 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1951, mand. overt.); Korth v. Tumlinson, 73 S.W.2d 1048 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1934, no writ).
26. Curnutte v. Houston, 163 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1942, writ refd
w.o.m.); Pansy Oil Co. v. Federal Oil Co., 91 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1936,
writ ref'd).
27. Commerce Sav. Ass'n v. GGE Management Co., 539 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [ist Dist.]), modified, 543 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. 1976); Burkitt v. McDonald, 64 S.W.
694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, no writ).
28. Sachs v. Ginsberg, 87 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1936); Sudderth v. Howard, 560 S.W.2d 511
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ refd n.r.e.); Woodman v. Bishop, 203 S.W.2d 977
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1947, no writ).
29. Skeen v. Slavik, 555 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
For an example of a "put and call" agreement, see text accompanying notes 108-10 infra.
30. Campbell v. Oskey, 239 S.W. 332 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1922, no writ); Fisher v.
Hoover, 21 S.W. 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ).
31. The Texas Constitution, as amended in 1891, allows parties to a contract to agree to
exact up to 10% interest per annum. Without such agreement, the maximum rate shall not
exceed 6% per annum. TEX. CONsT. art. XVI, § 11. The Texas Legislature, pursuant to a
1960 constitutional amendment, has supplemented from time to time the constitutional pro-
hibition against usury with additional statutes covering special lending situations as well as
with provisions affecting loans and interest in general. The general usury statute allows 10%
per annum. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (Vernon 1971). A corporation may
be charged up to 11h% per month or 18% per annum. Id. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon 1980).
Effective Sept. 1, 1975, up to 18% per annum may be charged on a loan in the principal
amount of $250,000 or more made for interim financing for construction on real property or
for financing or refinancing improved real property. Id. art. 5069-1.07(b) (Vernon Pam.
Supp. 1971-1979). A similar provision applies to loans in the principal amount of $500,000
or more for the purpose of oil and gas development and exploration. Id. art. 5069-1.07(c).
Article 5069-1.07 was amended by the 1979 legislature. Under the added provision, any
person may agree to pay any rate not exceeding 18% per annum, if such agreement is evi-
denced by a written bond, note, or other contract, on a loan or extension of credit in the
aggregate amount of $250,000 or more. This provision does not apply to a lien on a one-to-
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though the legislature has provided a broad statutory definition of usury,32
Texas courts follow the universally recognized elements of usury.33 For a
transaction to be judicially declared usurious, four elements are essential: 34
(1) the transaction must involve a loan of money, or something of value, or
the forbearance of a debt owed;35 (2) the parties must agree that the loan
shall be repayable absolutely; 36 (3) the lender must demand a greater
amount of return than is allowed by law; and (4) the lender must intend to
violate the law37 at the inception of the transaction.
The presence of these four elements in a transaction is conclusive of the
issue of usury, 38 while the absence of one element provides an absolute
defense. 39 An important corollary is that a court will look at the substance
of the transaction4° in its effort to detect the presence of the four elements
and will not be limited to the form of the transaction or to the parties'
characterization of it.
four family residence if it is occupied or will be occupied by the obligated party nor to a lien
on land intended to be used primarily for agricultural or ranching purposes. Under this
amendment, which became effective Aug. 27, 1979, a claim or defense of usury may not be
raised. Id. art. 5069-1.07(d). This prohibition against raising a claim or defense of usury
will undoubtedly be challenged because a borrower is constitutionally protected against
usury in Texas. The 1979 legislature also provided for a higher interest rate on loans se-
cured by one-to-four family residential dwellings. The new provision allows for either a
12% per annum rate or a floating rate based on United States Treasury notes. Id.; see Dor-
saneo, Creditor and Consumer Rights, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 253, 266-70
(1980).
32. Usury is defined as "interest in excess of the amount allowed by law." TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01 (a) (Vernon 1971). Interest is "the compensation allowed by
law for the use or forbearance or detention of money." Id. art. 5069-1.01(d).
33. See, e.g., Crow v. Home Sav. Ass'n, 522 S.W.2d 457, 459-60 (Tex. 1975); Bexar
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 78 Tex. 163, 168, 14 S.W. 227, 228 (1890). See generally 45
AM. JUR. 2D Interest and Usury § 111 (1969); 58 TEX. JUR. 2D Usury § 8 (1964).
34. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 526, Comment b (1932).
35. An advance of working capital to a joint venture, for example, is not a loan. Korth
v. Tumlinson, 73 S.W.2d 1048 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1934, no writ).
36. This element requires that the lender be subject to no substantial risk beyond the
possibility of the borrower's insolvency.
37. Intent, however, need not be specific, wilful, or subjective, but is determined from
the substance of the agreement itself. See notes 145-50 infra and accompanying text.
38. When a court finds usury, the penalty can be substantial. A person who contracts
for, charges, or receives usurious interest shall forfeit to the obligor three times the amount
of usurious interest, but in no event shall the amount be less than $2,000 or 20% of the
principal, whichever is smaller, and reasonable attorneys' fees. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1979). If the usurious interest is in excess of
double the amount of allowable interest, the principal of the loan shall also be forfeited as
an additional penalty. Id. art. 5069-1.06(2) (Vernon 1971).
39. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
40. Where the intent of a party to a bargain is to make a loan of money or an
extension of the maturity of a pecuniary debt for a greater profit than is al-
lowed by law, the agreement is illegal though the transaction is put in whole or
in part in the form of a sale, a contract to sell or other contract.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 529 (1932). "Parties may give the designation of a sale to a
transaction which they really intend as a usurious mortgage. And in all cases it is the sub-
stance not the form of a transaction which is important." Id. Comment g. See, e.g., Sachs v.
Ginsberg, 87 F.2d 28, 30 (5th Cir. 1936); Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1974, no writ); Campbell v. Oskey, 239 S.W. 332, 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1922, no writ).
1980]
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III. ELEMENTS OF USURY APPLIED TO EQUITY PARTICIPATION
TRANSACTIONS
With a workable definition of equity participation 4' and a framework
for discovering usury, the matter remains to detail how Texas courts42
have applied the framework to equity participation transactions, and to
suggest guidelines for formulating these transactions in the future. To es-
tablish whether an equity participation transaction could be regarded as
usurious, four questions should be posed: Is the transaction a loan? Is the
loan absolutely repayable? Is the maximum legal rate of return exceeded?
Did the lender intend a usurious return? The variations of equity partici-
pation transactions must be considered in light of these four questions. At
one extreme, a lender with an intent to circumvent the usury ceiling could
advance funds in return for an unconditional promise to repay the loan at
the maximum rate of legal interest plus a participation in the venture's
equity. Clearly, such an agreement would be usurious as long as the par-
ticipation had at least nominal value.43 At the other extreme, a lender
might advance funds with no return promise to pay any amount in ex-
change for a small participation in a very risky venture. Such an agree-
ment evidences none of the elements of usury. When lenders use an
intermediate approach and advance money in exchange for an absolute
promise to repay the principal with no interest or a low interest charge plus
an equity participation, usury questions arise. Pictured on a continuum,
these variations suggest that, as the guaranteed rate of return approaches
the legal maximum, the chances of a court finding usury under the four-
question analysis increase. 44
A. Is the Equity Particpation Transaction a Loan?
This first question seeks to distinguish between funds advanced as a con-
tribution to the capital of a venture and funds given in exchange for a
return of principal plus interest. The former is not a loan; the latter is.4 5
In many equity participation transactions, such a distinction is illusory;
therefore, the answer to this initial question depends on the factfinder's
perception of the transaction's substance.46 Texas courts have found either
41. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
42. Since 1950, 14 reported Texas cases have dealt with the subject of usury as it relates
to equity participation transactions. Seven of these 14 opinions have been within the last
five years. The increase of equity participation litigation is not inconsistent with earlier
predictions that such investments in one form or another would become a significant ele-
ment in lenders' portfolios. Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, Real Estate Equity Investments and
the Institutional Lender. Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 647
(1971). Only sporadic attention is given to the law of usury; it appears to come before the
courts in cyclical periods when interest rates approach the usury ceiling. Merriman &
Hanks, supra note 2, at 1.
43. See text accompanying notes 133-35 infra.
44. Hershman, "New Look," supra note 19, at 315; Comment, Equity Participation in
Real Estate Finance, 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 387, 395 (1976).
45. Korth v. Tumlinson, 73 S.W.2d 1048, 1050 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1934, no
writ).
46. A difficult case arises when parties structure a transaction other than in the form of
[Vol. 34
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that the following transactions are loans, or that they present for the
factfinder a legitimate question of whether or not the transaction is a loan:
a sale from the borrower to the lender with an option to repurchase,47 a
purchase by the lender followed by an immediate sale to the borrower, 48 a
"put and call" agreement, 49 a limited partnership agreement,50 a note se-
cured by a deed of trust and by a chattel mortgage lien,5' a note secured by
possession of goods,52 a vendor's lien,53 a draft fee agreement,54 a "grub-
stake deal," 55 and a partnership agreement.56
Eight situations appeared in these cases that may have been instrumen-
tal in convincing the trier of fact that, although the transaction was not
structured as a loan, the realities of the transaction supported the contrary
conclusion. These situations can be broadly categorized into two groups:
(1) the circumstances surrounding the transaction and (2) the relative bar-
gaining positions of the borrower and the lender.
Surrounding Circumstances.
Loan Sought by Borrower. An obvious indicator that the parties in-
tended the transaction to be a loan is that the borrower originally sought a
loan. In Sudderth v. Howard57 the plaintiffs applied for a bank loan and a
bank official introduced them to the defendant, Howard. Instead of ob-
taining a loan, the Sudderths deeded their property to Howard for $17,400
and obtained an option to repurchase the property within five months for
$20,010 plus accrued taxes. In the meantime, Howard permitted the Sud-
derths to remain on the property. When the option period expired, the
Sudderths brought suit against Howard, claiming that the combination
sale and repurchase option was a subterfuge to evade usury laws. Al-
though the evidence at trial conflicted as to the nature of the transaction,
the jury found that the parties intended a loan and not a sale.5 8
a loan, not to circumvent the usury prohibition, but for legitimate business reasons. See
Shanks, supra note 2, at 340-41.
47. Sudderth v. Howard, 560 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ refd
n.r.e.).
48. Sachs v. Ginsberg, 87 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1936); Commerce Say. Ass'n v. GGE Man-
agement Co., 539 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]), modpied, 543 S.W.2d 862
(Tex. 1976); Woodman v. Bishop, 203 S.W.2d 977 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1947, no
writ); Burkitt v. McDonald, 64 S.W. 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, no writ).
49. Skeen v. Slavik, 555 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
50. Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
51. Pickrell v. Alpha Pipe & Steel, Inc., 406 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1966, writ refd n.r.e.).
52. Campbell v. Oskey, 239 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1922, no writ).
53. Fisher v. Hoover, 21 S.W. 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ).
54. Kollman v. Hunnicutt, 385 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1964, no writ).
55. Ellis v. Security Underground Storage, Inc., 329 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1959, no writ).
56. Curnutte v. Houston, 163 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1942, writ refd
w.o.m.).
57. 560 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
58. Id. at 515. The court did not find usury, however, because the Sudderths did not
request any special issue concerning usury, which was an independent ground of recovery.
Id. at 516.
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Circumstances very similar to Sudderth became the subject of a usury
suit in Sachs v. Ginsberg.59 Having recently contracted to purchase a busi-
ness for $12,500, Ginsberg applied for a loan of $7,500 from Sachs to sup-
plement his own $5,000 holdings. Sachs agreed to advance $7,500 in
return for a bonus of $3,000. The business was conveyed to Sachs for the
recited consideration of $12,500, and Sachs executed a contract with Gins-
berg to sell him the business for $15,500. Until such sale, Sachs was to
receive one-half of all proceeds from the business. The court of civil ap-
peals, in affirming the trial court, viewed this transaction as a colorable
device to disguise a loan as an option to buy property that, in fact, had
already been bought.60
In Johns v. Jaeb6' Johns applied to Jaeb, a bank president, for a loan.
Jaeb declined to make the loan on behalf of the bank, but expressed his
personal interest. The parties then formed a limited partnership, with Jaeb
contributing $5,000 as the limited partner for a ninety-nine percent share
of the profits. In a separate agreement, Jaeb promised to sell his partner-
ship share to Johns for an interest-free $6,500 promissory note and to pass
title when the note was paid in full. In the meantime, Johns would draw a
salary of not more than $1,000 per month. The trial court held for Jaeb
against Johns' charge of usury, 62 but the court of civil appeals reversed and
rendered, concluding that the documents on their face showed that the
transaction was in substance a loan rather than a true limited partner-
ship.63
In Campbell v. Oskey64 Oskey had arranged to buy diamonds valued at
$1,800 for $750. He had applied to Campbell for a $750 loan, but was
refused. Campbell did agree, however, to advance the $750 in return for
$300 of the profit that Oskey would make on the diamonds. Until the
entire $1,050 was paid to Campbell, he kept the diamonds as security. The
court of civil appeals, affirming the trial court, found that the transaction
was a loan.65 In all four of the above cases, the fact that the borrower
initially applied for a loan may have weighed heavily in both the
factflnders' and appellate court's considerations. In every case in which
the lender argued that the advance of funds was a contribution to the capi-
tal of a partnership, the court rejected that argument by examining the
substance of the transaction rather than accepting its outward form. 66
Variance in Value. A large variance between what the lender advanced
59. 87 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1936).
60. Id. at 30.
61. 518 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
62. Id. at 858.
63. Id. at 859. The court went on to find an absolute obligation to repay and an intent
to charge usury. Id. at 860.
64. 239 S.W. 332 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1922, no writ).
65. Id. at 334. The court, in finding a loan, was influenced by discovering an absolute
obligation to repay. Id. Thus, the answer to the second question in the four-step analysis
may influence the answer to the first question.
66. Sachs v. Ginsberg, 87 F.2d 28, 30 (5th Cir. 1936); Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857, 859
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ); Campbell v. Oskey, 239 S.W. 332, 334 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1922, no writ).
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and the fair market value of what the borrower gave in exchange
may indicate a loan. For example, in Sudderth v. Howard67 the lender
"bought" the borrower's property for $87 an acre, a total of $17,400. Testi-
mony adduced at trial placed the value at $200 to $500 per acre, and the
lender himself valued the property at $150 to $160 per acre. With this
evidence, the jury was unable to characterize the transaction as a legiti-
mate, arms-length sale, especially in light of the option to repurchase. 68
Failure of Characterization. Another situation that might indicate that a
transaction is a loan is the failure of the transaction to fit into any category
other than a loan. In Johns v. Jaeb69 the lender argued that the transaction
was a limited partnership, evidenced by a signed certificate of limited part-
nership naming the lender as the limited partner. The court had difficulty
fitting the transaction into the limited partnership mold, however, because
of its failure to comply with the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.70 Thus,
because of this failure and other factors suggesting this transaction was a
loan,71 the court found for the borrower. Pickrell v. Alpha Ppe & Steel,
Inc.72 involved a similar set of facts. The lender alleged that his transac-
tions with the borrower constituted a joint venture or a temporary partner-
ship. The lender, through several transactions, had advanced a total of
$5,700 to the borrower for use in his business. In return, the lender col-
lected $6,700, of which $6,600 was evidenced by a note secured by a deed
of trust and a chattel mortgage lien. The court of civil appeals observed
that the facts did not reveal the characteristics of a joint venture, 73 nor did
they fall within the statutory definition of a partnership. 74 Thus, the court
affirmed the trial court's judgment of usury.75 In Commerce Savings Asso-
ciation v. GGE Management Co. 76 the lender purchased property from one
member of a joint venture and immediately transferred it to another mem-
ber of the joint venture for a $51,000 profit. The court found that the evi-
dence supported a finding that the lender acted solely as a lender and not
as a real estate purchaser. 77
No Additional Consideration. The absence of consideration for the ad-
vance of funds, other than the normal consideration given for the use of
money, constitutes an additional indication that the transaction is a loan.
67. 560 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
68. Id. at 514 n.2; see text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
69. 518 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
70. Id. at 860. The court found that the transaction failed to comply with TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 17 (Vernon 1970), which provides that a limited partner shall
not receive from a general partner any part of his contribution until all liabilities of the
partnership, with certain exceptions, have been paid or can be paid by partnership property.
71. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
72. 406 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
73. Id. at 958. The court discounted a joint venture because this transaction involved
several different loans, whereas, in the court's estimation, a joint venture is usually limited to
a single transaction.
74. See note 70 supra.
75. 406 S.W.2d at 959.
76. 539 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.]), modified, 543 S.W.2d 862
(Tex. 1976).
77. 539 S.W.2d at 78.
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In Curnutte v. Houston78 a partnership agreement recited that Houston
contributed $3,000 to Curnutte's construction company in consideration
for a note bearing ten percent interest. In addition, Houston was to receive
$.02 per cubic yard for all dirt moved by the company until the note ma-
tured. This additional amount was "for value received for services and
financial aid rendered. '79 At trial, however, Curnutte testified that the
parties had not agreed to any personal services, a fact that led the court of
civil appeals to conclude that the $.02 per cubic yard was part of the quid
pro quo for the $3,000 advance and provided sufficient evidence of usury
to take the case to the jury.80
Immediate Profit. A final circumstance surrounding the transaction that
may lead a court to find a loan occurs when a lender makes a substantial,
immediate profit. In Commerce Savings Association v. GGE Management
Co.81 the owner of certain real estate and member of a joint enterprise
conveyed the property for $349,000 to a savings association that immedi-
ately conveyed the property for $400,000 to GGE, whose president was
another member of the joint enterprise. Contemporaneously, GGE and its
president executed a $600,000 note at twelve percent interest and assigned
certain rents to the savings association. The court of civil appeals found
the whole transaction to be a disguise to evade the usury laws and held
that the $51,000 profit made by the savings association on the real estate
transaction was, in fact, front-end interest on the $600,000 note.8 2
Bargaining Position. In an attempt to discover the substance of a transac-
tion, courts have not only examined the circumstances surrounding a loan
but also have considered the strength of the borrower's bargaining position
relative to that of the lender's. If the borrower's bargaining strength is
weak, so that the transaction results in little benefit or in substantial risk of
loss to the borrower, courts more readily characterize the transaction as a
loan. Three final situations illustrate this readiness.
Ignorant Borrower. A court may take note of the level of sophistication
of the borrower. In Sudderth v. Howard,83 for example, Mrs. Sudderth
testified that when she entered into the transaction, she was under the im-
pression that she was obtaining a loan, despite the fact that she executed a
deed absolute on its face and an option to repurchase. The court voided
78. 163 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
79. Id. at 675.
80. Id. at 676.
81. 539 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]), modified, 543 S.W.2d 862
(Tex. 1976).
82. 539 S.W.2d at 79. The transaction was complicated. Gertner, president of GGE,
received $600,000 from Commerce, evidenced by a note bearing 12% interest. At the same
time, Merrill, a joint venturer with Gertner, conveyed property to Commerce who conveyed
it to GGE for an immediate $51,000 profit. In collateral agreements, Gertner and Com-
merce agreed to limit Gertner's personal liability to the unpaid principal, and Merrill and
his business associate, Westmoreland, guaranteed GGE's debt up to $600,000. The original
loan was later modified by reducing the principal and interest rate and by extending the
term of repayment. Id. at 74.
83. 560 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the deed, finding that a loan was intended.8 4
Borrower's Need. Another situation affecting the bargaining position of
the parties occurs when the borrower has an immediate need for cash.
Again in Sudderth, evidence showed that the $17,400 given in exchange for
property worth at least twice that value represented the sum that the bor-
rower needed for pressing debts and living expenses. Specifically, the In-
ternal Revenue Service had posted a notice to sell the borrower's property
to satisfy a $6,000 tax lien.85 Other cases in which a court has construed
the transaction to be a loan also have contained an element of urgency,
though motivated more by chance of profit than by risk of loss. In Kolman
v. Hunnicut,86 for example, the borrower needed money to enter the retail
automobile business. In Ellis v. Security Underground Storage, Inc.8 7 the
borrowers had a contract with the government whereby they would lease
certain property to the government for the storage of liquid fuel. Although
the borrowers were guaranteed the full first year's rental of $465,660, they
did not have the $365,000 needed to purchase certain equipment and to
modify the property. The court observed that the borrowers "were in the
position of the man who knows he can make a million dollars if he can get
his hands on a quarter of a million dollars to use."'88 Similarly, in Sachs v.
Ginsberg89 the borrower had a contract to purchase for $12,500 an on-
going business that had an inventory of $30,000. In Campbell .Oskey,90
the borrower had arranged to purchase diamonds valued at $1,800 for
$750. In each of these cases, the borrower's urgent need for adequate
funds diluted his bargaining power. Any such need should be noted when
deciding whether a particular transaction is a loan or a contribution to
capital.
Lender Takes Title. A final indicator of a borrower's meager bargaining
position is a lender's requirement of a transfer of title to himself as a con-
dition for making the advance. 9' In Sachs Y. Ginsberg92 the purchaser of a
business concern needed capital for the purchase. The lender advanced a
84. Id. at 514.
85. Id. at 513-14.
86. 385 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1964, no writ).
87. 329 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1959, no writ).
88. Id. at 315.
89. 87 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1936).
90. 239 S.W. 332 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1922, no writ).
91. This type of transaction is normally accompanied by an option to purchase given to
the borrower. A similar transaction is the sale-leaseback, in which the borrower "sells" his
property to the lender and the lender leases the property back to the borrower. This ar-
rangement provides the borrower with capital up to the fair market value of the property,
which is more than could be obtained by conventional financing. The lender is secure be-
cause he holds title to the property and receives periodic rental payments from the borrower.
Often, the lender also grants the borrower an option to repurchase the property. The sale-
leaseback transaction raises the issue of whether the transaction is a legitimate sale or a
device to evade usury. For a treatment of this issue, see Marcus, supra note 14; Moewe, Sale
and Leaseback Financing of Real Estate as Mortgages Under California Law, 48 CAL. ST.
B.J. 554 (1973); Podell, supra note 14, at 145-47; Wilson, Sale and Lease-Back-A Re-Ap-
praisal, 4 W. RES. L. REV. 318 (1953); Comment, Real Estate Sale-Leaseback Agreements
Under Texas Usury Law- Circumvention or Sale?, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 821 (1976).
92. 87 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1936).
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portion of the needed cash, but also required that the business be conveyed
to him. The agreement provided that the lender hold title until the bor-
rower paid him the amount advanced plus a considerable bonus. Sudderth
v. Howard93 involved a similar fact situation because the lender required
the borrowers to deed over their property while granting them an option to
repurchase the property within five months. In these situations, the lender
acts as a conduit through which title may pass. If the transaction is suc-
cessful, the borrower will ultimately receive title to the property, but if he
is unable to obtain the required money, title remains with the lender.
Thus, title provides the lender both security in the transaction and leverage
over the borrower.
B. Is the Loan Absolutely Repayable?94
In attempting to discern absoluteness of repayment, commentators make
a distinction between the contingency of the principal and the contingency
of the interest elements of a loan.95 The former is known as the "risk of
loss" doctrine and the latter as the "contingency" rule. The risk of loss
doctrine operates when the lender's return on the amount advanced is en-
tirely dependent on the success of the enterprise. 96 In that event, no usury
will be found no matter how successful the enterprise. The rationale of
this doctrine is that any excess return is consideration for the risk under-
taken and is independent of any interest charged, which is consideration
for the forbearance of the debt. To fall within this exception to usury,
however, the risk may need to be substantial enough that a prudent person
would not assume it for the legal maximum only. 97 The contingency rule
operates when the principal is absolutely repayable, but the interest
charged is dependent on some contingency outside the lender's control,
such as enterprise profits.98 If the interest is subject to a contingency, the
loan is unlikely to be held usurious even if the contingency occurs and the
enterprise becomes highly profitable. The rationale for the contingency
rule is that the lender could have charged the maximum interest allowed
93. 560 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.).
94. This second question may overlap the first. Because a loan normally contains an
absolute promise to repay, a court may look for such an obligation as an indicator that the
equity participation transaction is a loan. See note 65 supra.
95. Comment, Lender Participation In Borrower's Venture.- A Scheme to Receive Usuri-
ous Interest, 8 Hous. L. REV. 546, 558-59 (1971); Comment, supra note 38, at 394-95. This
distinction between contingencies may be purely academic, however, because Texas courts
have never recognized it. Furthermore, the willingness of a modem investor to receive only
contingent payments appears unlikely outside of a joint venture. Podell, supra note 14, at
144. In any case, the rationale for both rules is that the lender should receive compensation
for the risk taken.
96. The transaction described may not even be a loan, but for the sake of discussion
under this step in the analysis, the existence of a loan will be assumed.
97. Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 475 (1967). But see Beavers v. Taylor, 434 S.W.2d 230, 231
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968, writ ref d n.r.e.) (contract not usurious when lender receives
uncertain value, even though probable value greater than lawful interest). See also Note,
Usury Laws: Loansfor a Share of the Profits, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 198, 198-99 (1954).
98. Comment, Lender Participation in Borrower's Venture.: A Scheme to Receive Usuri-
ous Interest, 8 Hous. L. REV. 546, 558-59 (1971).
[Vol. 34
COMMENTS
by law, but by charging a lesser amount plus some contingent amount, the
lender may never realize the legal maximum. Compensation for that risk
is not, then, interest on the loan.99 The contingency rule, like the risk of
loss doctrine, may apply only when the risk is substantial. °°
The rationale of risk compensation is sensible in a situation where the
lender exacts an absolute promise only for the return of the principal, leav-
ing any additional return entirely dependent upon some contingency. The
rule is questionable, in terms of risk compensation, when the lender is
promised a return of the principal plus interest plus a contingency return.
One commentator has suggested that the contingency rule may not be ap-
propriate when the fixed sum is close to the statutory ceiling and the con-
tingent sum results in a return substantially in excess of the legal
maximum.101
In applying the above two principles, a court will closely scrutinize the
risk or contingency by distinguishing a real contingency from a theoretical
one, or a clearly speculative transaction from a barely speculative one. 10 2
The degree of uncertainty and speculation, however, must be measured at
99. See Comment, supra note 18, at 929.
100. Cf. Thompson v. Hague, 430 S.W.2d .293, 296 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968,
no writ) (court found payments by third parties not speculative).
101. Hershman, 'Wew Look," supra note 19, at 315-16.
102. Compare Beavers v. Taylor, 434 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968, writ refd
n.r.e.) with Thompson v. Hague, 430 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, no
writ). See also Loiseaux, supra note 17, at 433-34. This distinction between degrees of con-
tingency has been explained as follows:
Usury laws do not forbid the taking of business chances in the employment
of money. A creditor who takes the chance of losing all or part of the sum to
which he would be entitled if he bargained for the return of his money with
the highest permissible rate of interest is allowed to contract for greater profit
.... If the probability of the occurrence of the contingency on which dimin-
ished payment is promised is remote, or if the diminution should the contin-
gency occur is slight as compared with the possible profit to be obtained if the
contingency does not occur, the transaction is presumably usurious.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 527, Comment a (1932).
"The following illustrations explain this concept:
A borrows $5000 from B, promising to repay him in a year with interest at
more than the highest permissible rate if A succeeds in marketing his crop of
wheat for the ensuing year for a dollar a bushel; otherwise to repay the loan at
the end of the year without interest. The bargain is not usurious unless the
probability of selling the crop for a dollar is so great as to make the transaction
a colorable device for the execution of usury.
A borrows from B $5000, payable in three years. It is provided in the bar-
gain that instead of interest A shall pay B one-tenth of the profits of A's busi-
ness. Although it is anticipated that this will exceed the amount of interest at
the highest permissible rate, the bargain is not usurious in view of the contin-
gency that the anticipation may not be realized.
A borrows from B $5000, payable in three years, secured by mortgage. The
contract for the loan provides that if the debtor dies from tuberculosis before
the note is due, the debt shall be cancelled. The rate of interest provided for is
largely in excess of that permitted by the local usury law. A does not have
tuberculosis at the time of the loan and there is no probability that he will
acquire the disease. The provision is inserted as a device to evade the usury
law. The loan is usurious.
Id. Illustrations 2-4 (emphasis added).
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the time of entering the transaction.10 3 Furthermore, a distinction may be
made between a contingent occurrence and contingent value. When an
occurrence is contingent, the lender receives nothing if the contingency
does not occur. When the value is contingent, the lender is guaranteed a
return, but its value is speculative. A contingent occurrence appears to
involve more risk than a contingent value because the latter guarantees at
least some return. In addition, valuing a contingency may present a diffi-
cult determination for the trier of fact, whereas the occurrence of a con-
tigency can be easily determined. 1' 4
Texas courts have faced the problem of deciding whether the lender in a
given transaction was subject to a sufficient contingency or risk such that
the loan was not usurious. Since contingency and risk are rather subjec-
tive, relative, and dependent on a given fact situation, no absolute test pro-
vides an easy solution. A comparison of court decisions, however, suggests
an analysis based on a continuum that may be used to guide parties seek-
ing to construct an equity participation loan agreement. At one extreme is
guaranteed repayment for the lender and at the other extreme is complete
uncertainty of repayment. As one moves from certainty to uncertainty on
the continuum, the following are encountered, in order: (1) a secured
lender's position; (2) a binding promise by the borrower to repay; (3) a lack
of perceptible risk to the lender; (4) unpredictable market conditions af-
fecting the success of a venture; (5) a choice in the hands of a disinterested
third party; and (6) a decision totally under the borrower's control.
A transaction guaranteeing a return occurs when the lender provides
himself with adequate security to ensure repayment by the borrower, as in
Woodman v. Bishop.10 5 Bishop desired to purchase a parcel of land for
$21,140. He had already paid $1,000 earnest money and an additional
$1,000 for an extension on the contract of sale. Bishop also contracted to
sell a small portion of the land to another party for $15,000. Needing an
additional $20,000,106 Bishop approached Woodman, promising to split
evenly the $60,000 expected profits from the sale of the land in exchange
for a $20,000 advance. Woodman declined, but offered to advance $20,000
for a return of $40,000. The ultimate transaction was multifaceted. The
seller conveyed the property to Bishop, who conveyed the property, less a
portion he had already contracted to sell, to Woodman, who reconveyed
the property to Bishop while retaining a vendor's lien of $40,000 bearing
interest at ten percent per annum. Bishop also executed a deed of trust
securing the payment of the $40,000. The court was not fooled by this
property shuffling and found a usurious loan based on an absolute obliga-
103. See Wagner v. Austin Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 525 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1975, no writ).
104. Compare Wagner v. Austin Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 525 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1975, no writ) (involving contingent occurrence and contingent value) with Gulf
At. Life Ins. Co. v. Price, 566 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(jury returned inconsistent findings regarding contingent value).
105. 203 S.W.2d 977 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1947, no writ).
106. The facts do not clearly reveal why Bishop needed $20,000, because he had already
received partial payment on the $15,000 tract. Id. at 978.
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tion to repay. 10 7
A transaction only slightly more risky than the above is one in which the
lender exacts from the borrower a binding promise to repay. In Skeen v.
Slavik'08 the lender purchased $300,000 of stock in the borrower's busi-
ness under a "put and call" agreement'0 9 by which the lender could re-
quire the borrower to repurchase the stock at any time for $360,000. In
carrying out this transaction, the borrower later paid $50,000 and issued a
note to the lender for $310,000. The court of civil appeals reversed and
rendered the trial court's judgment for the lender, construing the transac-
tion as a loan made absolutely repayable by the initial payment plus the
note. 10 Johns v. Jaeb " I I also involved a promissory note. In that case the
lender advanced $5,000 and received a note for $6,500 without interest,
payable in six months. The court of civil appeals found an absolute obli-
gation to repay and therefore reversed the trial court's judgment for the
lender. 1 2 The court reached a similar result in Campbell v. Oskey,"13 in
which the lender advanced $750 in exchange for a $150 payment and a
$900 note.
The next step on the continuum towards uncertainty of repayment in-
volves a transaction in which the lender exacts no security ensuring pay-
ment nor binding promise of repayment, but in which, nevertheless, no
perceptible risk is identified. In Thompson v. Hague"14 the lender ad-
vanced $40,000 in exchange for a five-year interest-free note in that
amount. In lieu of interest on the note, the borrower assigned his interest
in lease revenues from a business property, such assignment to terminate
when the $40,000 note was paid. The expected lease revenues amounted to
nearly $8,000 per month. The court found that, although payments in lieu
of interest would be made by lessees rather than by the borrower and no
proof of the present market value of the right to collect further rents ex-
isted, the value of the lease assignment was nonetheless not contingent or
speculative. "15 The court in Johns v. Jaeb"16 used similar language regard-
ing lack of perceptible risk, noting that, despite the lender's claim that the
advance of funds was a contribution to a limited partnership, the amount
invested was not subject to the risk of the enterprise because the borrower
had made an absolute promise to return the funds advanced even if the
venture failed.17
Even further removed from absoluteness of repayment is a transaction
107. Id.
108. 555 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
109. A "put and call" agreement is one by which the seller can force the sale (or "put")
on the buyer, and the buyer can force the seller to sell (or "call") at a price and under
conditions previously arranged. See note 29 supra.
110. 555 S.W.2d at 522.
111. 518 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
112. Id. at 860-61.
113. 239 S.W. 332 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1922, no writ).
114. 430 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, no writ).
115. Id. at 296.
116. 518 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
117. Id. at 860.
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in which repayment is contingent upon unpredictable market conditions
affecting the success of a venture. At this point along the continuum, a
court is less likely to find an absolute obligation for repayment. For exam-
ple, in Beavers v. Taylor'18 the lender advanced $5,000 for a note in that
amount bearing no interest. In lieu of interest, the borrower agreed to pay
a graduated percentage of gross monthly sales of his business. This re-
quirement resulted in a twenty percent return on the lender's investment.
The court found no usury, however, because the consideration given in
lieu of interest was contingent upon the enterprise's making sales, and the
amount of those sales was highly uncertain." 19 A nearly identical case is
Pansy Oil Co. v. Federal Oil Co., 120 in which payments on the loan were to
be made only out of oil to be produced from wells that were not drilled at
the time the lender advanced the funds.
When the contingency controlling repayment depends not on general
market conditions, but rests solely in the hands of a disinterested third
party, the repayment is even less absolute. In Wagner v. Austin Savings &
Loan Association 12' the lender advanced $50,000 for a note of that amount
bearing 7 /% interest. The borrower also assigned to the lender a refund
contract that the borrower contemplated would be executed in his favor by
a municipality. Under the refund contract, the borrower, a developer,
would receive eighty percent of the amount he expended in constructing a
water system. In rejecting an allegation of usury, the court noted that the
refund contract was not executed until eleven months after its assignment
to the lender, and that even after execution, the city was not obligated to
pay until several contingencies had occurred. 122 Thus, even though the
refund contract was eventually worth $12,000, its value at the time of as-
signment could not be determined.' 23
The closest step toward total uncertainty of the lender's return involves
the situation in which the contingency of repayment depends on the bor-
rower's free choice, as illustrated by Korth v. Tumlinson.124 Tumlinson
needed funds to pay off a debt on real property. Korth advanced the
needed funds under an agreement that stipulated that if the land was sold
within twelve months, Korth would receive ten percent of the money ad-
vanced plus a specific share of the proceeds. If the land was not sold
within twelve months, Korth would receive seventy of the 270 acres in
consideration for his advance of funds. The court found no usury, reason-
ing that Tumlinson made no absolute promise to repay and that any con-
sideration to be received by Korth was of uncertain value.' 25
118. 434 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
119. Id. at 232.
120. 91 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1936, writ ref'd).
121. 525 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, no writ).
122. Id. at 731.
123. Id. at 727. This case involved, at the beginning of the transaction, both a contingent
occurrence and a contingent value.
124. 73 S.W.2d 1048 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1934, no writ).
125. Id. at 1049-50.
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C. Is the Maximum Legal Return Exceeded?
Once a transaction has been identified as a loan with an absolute obliga-
tion to repay, the next question to be examined is whether the return on
the advance of funds exceeds the amount allowed by law.126 Two consid-
erations are important in determining the answer to that question. First,
courts spread the amount of return over the entire term of the loan in
ascertaining whether usury has been exacted. 127 Secondly, courts may in-
clude other charges made for the advance of funds as part of the consider-
ation for the use of money.' 28
Before a court will conclude that a loan is usurious, the legal maximum
must be exceeded over the entire term of the loan, and not just in one
given year. 129 This principle is important in equity participation transac-
tions, especially when the equity interest is in the profits of a new venture.
In the beginning years when the likelihood for high profits is small, the
balance on the principal is large, whereas in later years the loan balance is
small, but the potential earnings may be substantial. 130 The low return in
early years may offset the higher return in later years and save the transac-
tion from being usurious. This principle may also save an equity partici-
pation transaction in which the lender receives a substantial and
immediate profit. For example, in Commerce Savings Association v. GGE
Management Co.131 the lender "purchased" property from a joint venture
and immediately "sold" it to another member of the joint venture for a
$51,000 profit. The court held that the $51,000 constituted additional in-
terest on a ten-year $600,000 note bearing twelve percent interest. When
the $51,000 was spread over ten years and added to the twelve percent
interest, however, the return was still within the statutory maximum. 132
In spreading the return over the entire period of an equity participation
loan, two problems may be encountered: valuation of a contingent return
and determination of the loan period. Guf/tlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Price 33
illustrates the first problem. The lender advanced $260,000 for a term of
two years at ten percent. The agreement further provided an option to the
lender to purchase twenty-five percent of the borrower's enterprise for the
126. For the applicable Texas usury statutes, see notes 31, 32 & 38 supra.
127. Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 781-87 (Tex. 1977); Nevels v. Harris,
129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937).
128. See, e.g., Trinity Fire Ins. Co. v. Kerrville Hotel Co., 129 Tex. 310, 322-23, 103
S.W.2d 121, 127-28 (1937); Terry v. Teachworth, 431 S.W.2d 918, 924-26 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ refd n.r.e.).
129. Commerce Sav. Ass'n v. GGE Management Co., 539 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [ist Dist.]), modified, 543 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. 1976). But see Comment, Usury in
Texas.- Spreading Interest Over the Entire Period of the Loan, 12 Hous. L. REV. 159 (1974).
See also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1979),
which provides that determination of interest on any loan secured by real property shall be
made by amortizing, prorating, allocating, and spreading all interest over the full term of the
loan.
130. Hershman, 'Wew Look," supra note 19, at 316.
131. 539 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston lIst Dist.]), modofed, 543 S.W.2d 862
(Tex. 1976).
132. 539 S.W.2d at 82.
133. 566 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
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sum of $1,000. At trial, special issues were submitted to the jury in an
effort to determine the value of the option. The answers, however, were
irreconcilable. In one special issue, the jury determined that the option
had a value of $31,000 on the day it was granted. In another issue, the jury
answered that on the same date, the value of the option was uncertain or
speculative. In the face of these inconsistent findings, the court of civil
appeals remanded the case 134 so that the question of usury could be con-
cluded depending on the outcome of the fact findings.' 35
A second problem in spreading the return over the entire term of the
loan is determining the loan period. An equity participation agreement
could be found to be a loan with an absolute obligation to repay a high
return, but with no identifiable period of return. For example, consider
the following facts. 136 The borrower needs capital to enter a retail busi-
ness. The lender puts $10,000 into a bank account under an agreement
whereby the borrower can withdraw funds in any amount at any time up
to the $10,000 limit. The borrower must repay the withdrawals within
sixty days and, in addition, pay a "draft fee" determined by a graduated
scale, the fee being higher the longer the money is outstanding. The bor-
rower makes frequent small withdrawals and holds them for the sixty-day
maximum, thereby incurring many draft fees at the highest amount. After
six months the borrower has withdrawn $5,000 and paid $5,700. Realizing
that at this rate he will use the $10,000 in one year at a cost of $1,400, the
borrower brings suit, alleging that the lender is charging greater than ten
percent interest on the $10,000. This transaction is clearly a loan 137 with
an absolute promise to repay, but the court now must determine the period
of the loan.' 38 If the borrower had continued making similar withdrawals,
indeed the return would have been usurious. The borrower may have had
less need for cash in the ensuing months, however, and could have taken
an additional year to use up the $10,000. Assuming withdrawals of a simi-
lar denomination, the draft fees of $1,400 would now cover a period of a
year and a half and be within the legal maximum. Thus, spreading the
return over the entire term of the loan, normally a simple mathematical
calculation, may require a legal determination of the loan period in some
equity participation transactions.139
134. Id. at 384. But cf. Thompson v. Hague, 430 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1968, no writ) (value found to be certain despite no proof of amount), discussed at
text accompanying notes 114-15 supra.
135. The jury's conflicting findings reflect the tension between the second and third ques-
tions in the usury analysis. Once the trier of fact determines that the obligation is absolute,
the valuation step must follow. Declaring an obligation sufficiently absolute may be com-
paratively easy, but translating that obligation into dollars and cents is difficult.
136. These facts are a variation of those in Kollman v. Hunnicutt, 385 S.W.2d 600 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1964, no writ), the main difference in that case being that the bor-
rower had withdrawn all of the funds at the time the suit was brought.
137. Id. at 602.
138. Though the Texas Supreme Court has addressed this problem in W.E. Grace Mfg.
Co. v. Levin, 506 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. 1974), the full principal plus interest had been paid when
suit was brought.
139. Another example of the problem in determining the period of return is suggested by
Sachs v. Ginsberg, 87 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1936). A borrower needs $8,000 to supplement his
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COMMENTS
When a court is determining whether the legal maximum rate has been
exceeded, items that the parties did not deem to be interest may be in-
cluded. 140 In Cochran v. American Savings & Loan Association14 1 the loan
agreement granted the lender an option to buy a portion of the borrower's
property for $80,000 plus ten percent interest from the date of the loan
commitment. When the agreement was later modified, the option price
was reduced by deleting the interest, which amounted to $4,000. When the
borrower later brought suit against the lender, the jury found that the op-
tion itself constituted interest, but that it had no money value to the lender
beyond the $80,000 purchase cost. 142 The $4,000 deletion from the
purchase price, however, also constituted additional interest in the jury's
opinion.' 43 Since the lender was already charging the maximum rate on
the principal of the loan, the $4,000 deletion proved to be fatal to the
lender's defense. 44
D. Did the Lender Intend a Usurious Return?
Once an affirmative answer is given to each of the first three questions,
courts experience little difficulty in finding usurious intent. Intent to
charge usury need not be subjective in the sense that the lender cognitively
knew that the return would exceed the legal maximum.145 Neither is spe-
cific intent required, 46 but only an intent to receive the amount of interest
charged.' 47 Intent may be evidenced by the attending circumstances, 48
own $8,000 in order to purchase a business for $16,000. The lender is willing to advance the
needed $8,000 if he can make a return of $10,000. The resulting transaction involves a
contract providing that the borrower and the lender combine their capital, the lender requir-
ing that the business be conveyed to him. The borrower does not make any express promise
to pay the lender $10,000. Instead, the borrower is given an option to buy the business at
any time within five years for $10,000. Until that option is exercised, the lender receives
one-half of gross receipts, the other half to be used for operating expenses, purchases, and a
salary for the borrower not to exceed' $250 per month. Although the borrower is not abso-
lutely obligated to pay the $10,000, he will lose his $8,000 investment if he does not exercise
his option. That factor might be sufficient for a court to find an absolute obligation. Assum-
ing the borrower brought suit without exercising the option, the question would arise con-
cerning the term of the loan, because the option could be exercised at any time in the five-
year period. Had the $10,000 been paid in the first year, the return would have been usuri-
ous, but payment at the end of the fifth year would probably not constitute usury, unless the
return from the gross receipts when added to the $10,000 exceeded the usury ceiling. Thus,
the court would be faced with a determination of the period of the loan even though the
parties themselves made no such determination.
140. See generaly Comment, Usury Implications of Front-End Interest and Interest in Ad-
vance, 29 Sw. L.J. 748 (1975).
141. 568 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
142. Id. at 675,
143. Id. at 674. The court appeared perplexed by the jury findings and commented that
if the option had no value to the lender without the added interest, it could have no money
value to the lender with the added interest. Id. at 675.
144. The case was remanded to the trial court in its entirety, giving the lender a chance to
prove that the usurious charge was the result of accidental and bona fide error. Id. at 676.
145. Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ); South-
western Inv. Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc., 511 S.W.2d 724, 734 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo), writ refdn.r.e per curiam, 516 S.W.2d 136 (1974).
146. Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 475, 481 (1967).
147. Actual receipt of the interest is not necessary. A usury action can be based on a
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but the transaction documents themselves are the most important indica-
tor. Apart from the possibility of mistake, 49 the intent of the parties is
presumed to be reflected in the documents. 50
In the absence of documentation or in addition to it, a court may find
intent from the entire transaction. In Ellis v. Security Underground Stor-
age, Inc.1 51 the lender advanced money to the borrower for use in improv-
ing his property in order to qualify for a government leasing program.
Under the terms of the agreement, the lender would receive six percent
interest on the principal and a percentage of the lease revenues, plus an
additional amount if the government cancelled the lease. Because the
length of the lease and the revenues from the lease could not be ascer-
tained in advance, the lender could not have intended to collect an identi-
fied sum. When the borrower filed suit alleging usury, however, the lawful
maximum had been exceeded. Based on that excess and on other evi-
dence, the court concluded that the evidence raised the ultimate issue of
whether the lender intended to charge usury.152
The amount of interest actually received may also be considered as evi-
dence of intent. In Thompson v. Hague'53 the lender advanced $40,000 in
exchange for an interest free note in that amount plus an assignment of
lease revenues as a bonus in lieu of interest that would expire when the
note was paid. The lease revenues amounted to $8,000 per month, or
twenty percent of the principal advanced. The court commented that the
amount of return was "so palpably in excess of legal interest as to show an
intent to evade usury law."' 54
Finally, the circumstances and negotiations that preceded the transac-
tion may be material to intent.' 55 The characterization of the loan by the
parties and testimony from the parties, however, carry very little weight.' 5 6
IV. CONCLUSION
As long as equity participation transactions appear attractive to lenders
and borrowers, they will be used. Basically, an equity participation trans-
action involves an advance of money in consideration for some form of
ownership position in the borrower's enterprise given in lieu of or in addi-
contract for, charge for, or receipt of usurious interest. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
5069-1.06(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1979).
148. Imperial Corp. of America v. Frenchman's Creek Corp., 453 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th
Cir. 1972).
149. Cochran v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 568 S.W.2d 672, 676-77 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1978, no writ); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp.
1971-1979) ("there shall be no penalty for any usurious interest which results from an acci-
dental and bona fide error"). See also Hershman, Usury, supra note 2, at 336.
150. Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
151. 329 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1959, no writ).
152. Id. at 318.
153. 430 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, no writ).
154. Id. at 296.
155. Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 475, 481 (1967).




tion to simple interest. The lender's ownership position might be co-own-
ership with the borrower or sole ownership that is later transferred to the
borrower. In either case, equity participation is designed to give the lender
a high return on the investment, often in excess of the maximum legal rate
allowed on a simple loan. Such a return raises a question of usury that,
until recently, Texas courts have infrequently addressed.
For an equity participation transaction to be declared usurious, the trier
of fact must affirmatively answer four questions. Is the transaction a loan?
Is the loan absolutely repayable? Is the maximum legal return exceeded?
Did the lender intend a usurious loan? The first two questions receive the
most attention in equity participation cases.
In determining whether or not the transaction is a loan, a court may
consider eight situations. The first five relate to the circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction and the last three to the relative bargaining posi-
tion of the borrower and the lender. These situations occur when: the
borrower had originally sought a loan; the amount advanced and the con-
sideration given in exchange greatly varied; the transaction failed to fit into
another category; evidence supporting any independent consideration was
lacking; the lender made a substantial and immediate profit; the borrower
lacked sophistication; the borrower needed immediate cash; and the lender
required a transfer of title to himself.
When deciding whether or not the loan is absolutely repayable, a court
examines the risks to which the lender subjected the return. If the return is
subject to a substantial contingency, a court is unlikely to find an absolute
obligation to repay. By viewing absoluteness of repayment and total un-
certainty as opposite extremes on a continuum, a court can chart various
positions between them. Scanning from absoluteness to uncertainty, one
observes the following: a secured lender's position, a binding promise by
the borrower to repay, a lack of perceptible risk to the lender, unpredict-
able market conditions affecting the success of a venture, a choice in the
hands of a disinterested third party, and a decision totally under the bor-
rower's control.
The third and fourth questions are more easily answered. In determin-
ing whether the legal maximum was exceeded, a court will spread the re-
turn over the entire term of the loan and will include all charges that it
construes to be interest. Although this task is relatively simple, it may
raise problems of valuation and timing. Finally, unless the lender is able
to show a bona fide mistake, the court will easily find usurious intent from
various sources.
With these facts and observations in mind, parties to an equity partici-
pation transaction should be able to structure the transaction to minimize
the risks of usury. Simply stated, by avoiding the eight factors that tend to
evidence a loan and by confining transactions to the uncertainty end of the
contingency continuum, each transaction should withstand an allegation
of usury. Careful planning may allow a lender's dream to come true.
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